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T
he hazard and operability, or HAZOP, study is a prime method for the identi cation of
hazards on process plants. This is the  rst in a series of papers which describes progress
in the emulation of hazard identi cation in the style of HAZOP. The work reported is
embodied in a computer aid for hazard identi cation, or HAZOP emulator, HAZID. The
HAZID code is one of a suite of codes developed as part of the STOPHAZ project. The present
paper gives an overview of HAZID, with an account of HAZOP and HAZOP emulation, and of
the issues underlying it.
Companion papers describe the unit model system, the  uid model system and the
evaluation of consequences, the evaluation and improvement of HAZID using case studies and
other methods, and some development topics. Conclusions from the work are given in the  nal
paper.
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INTRODUCTION
The hazard and operability, or HAZOP, study is now well
established as a prime method for the identi cation of
hazards on process plants. It does, however, make
considerable demands in time and effort on the engineering
teams involved. It has therefore appeared attractive to try to
develop computer codes for HAZOP. It is recognized that
HAZOP activity is a creative task and developers of such
codes have usually been wary of suggesting that their
systems could replace HAZOP, preferring instead to
indicate that they should be used as aids to, or in advance
of, HAZOP.
Accounts of a number of such computer aids have been
given in the literature, as described below. The present
paper is the  rst of a series which describes the creation of a
computer aid for hazard identi cation, or HAZOP emulator,
HAZID. The HAZID code is one of a suite of codes
developed as part of the STOPHAZ project1,2,3. STOPHAZ
was a major ESPRIT project, involving the collaboration of
ten partners across Europe over a period of 3 years. The
partners were: Aspentech (Belgium), Bureau Veritas
(France), Hyprotech (Spain), ICI Engineering (UK),
Intrasoft (Greece), Loughborough University (UK), SfK
(UK), Snamprogetti (Italy), TXT (Italy) and VTT (Finland).
The present paper gives an overview of HAZID, with an
account of HAZOP and HAZOP emulation, and of the
issues underlying it. Other papers in this series describe the
unit model system, the  uid model system, the evaluation of
consequences, several case studies used to evaluate and
improve HAZID, and some topics for future development of
the tool.
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
There are now available a large number of methods of
hazard identi cation and techniques preliminary to hazard
analysis. They include:
1. Check-lists.
2. What if? analysis.
3. Failure modes and effects analysis.
4. Coarse hazard study.
5. HAZOP.
6. Event tree analysis.
7. Fault tree analysis.
8. Cause-consequence analysis.
9. Sneak analysis.
10. Task analysis.
11. Scenario development.
12. Preliminary hazards analysis.
13. Preliminary safety analysis.
Overviews of these and other methods of hazard
identi cation have been given by the Center for Chemical
Process Safety4,5 and Lees6. The development of computer
aids to support some of these techniques is an active area,
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and there are certain common features of these methodol-
ogies. This applies in particular to failure modes and effects
analysis and fault tree synthesis as well as HAZOP.
HAZOP STUDIES
The HAZOP technique was described in 1974 by
Lawley7. The CIA guide8 produced in 1977 covers batch
as well as continuous processes. Since then HAZOP has
undergone much development and many extensions and
enhancements. Many of these are described in the guide by
Knowlton9 issued in 1992. Of the numerous accounts
published, particularly valuable are those which give
worked examples (Lawley7,10, CIA8, Rushford11, Austin
and Jeffrey12, Sinnott13, Piccinini and Levy14, Kletz15,
Ozog16, Flothmann and Mjaavatten17, Kavianian, Rao and
Brown18, Wells and co-workers19-21).
The activity of HAZOP has itself been the subject of
investigation. Roach and Lees22 sat in on and recorded a
number of HAZOP studies. Freeman, Lee, and McNamara23
and Jefferson, Illidge and Rushton24 have studied conduct of
HAZOPs by experts and by novices. Jefferson, Illidge, and
Rushton found that whereas the novice team leader tends to
work systematically through the sequence—deviation-
cause-consequence-action—and to seek to identify for
each deviation every cause and every consequence, the
expert tends to consider a scenario as a whole and to be
more selective in the choice of scenarios. In the UK the
operator of an offshore installation is required to prepare a
safety case. HAZOP studies are conducted as part of this.
An investigation of the quality assurance of such HAZOPs
has been made by Rushton and co-workers25,26.
QUALITATIVE MODELLING
The most common approach taken by workers in
computer-aiding of hazard identi cation has been to
develop for typical process units, such as vessels and
pumps, qualitative models of the in uence of one process
variable on another. A plant description is then created
which consists of a set of unit models, generally taken from
a unit model library, together with the connectivities
between the units. Using this plant description it is then
possible to follow the propagation of faults through the
plant. An early example of the use of such qualitative
models was the work of Andow and Lees27,28 on the
creation of an alarm data structure for a plant in support of
real time alarm analysis.
The propagation of a fault through a plant may be
represented in terms of the initiation of a fault in a unit
which is unhealthy, the passage of the fault through units
which are otherwise healthy and the termination of the fault
in a unit which is thereby rendered unhealthy. The unit may
be modelled by a set of functional, or propagation,
equations, together with suitable fault initiations and
terminations. A functional equation describes the relation
between an output parameter of a unit and the input and
other output parameters. A typical functional equation is
L = f (Q1 , 2 Q2)
which signi es that the level L increases if the inlet  ow Q1
increases or the outlet  ow Q2 decreases, and vice versa.
Andow and Lees used functional equations of this type to
create a network in which the nodes represented the process
variables and the arcs the in uences between the variables.
They then ‘combed’ it to obtain a reduced network in which
the nodes now represented those variables which were
measured and could thus be provided with an alarm.
A graphical representation which is widely used in
engineering is the directed graph, or digraph, also know as a
signal  ow graph. Accounts are given by Henley and
Williams29, Deo30, Harary, Norman and Cartwright31 and
Gould32. A digraph consists of a set of nodes joined by
directed arcs. It is therefore a natural tool for the
representation of fault propagation in process plants.
The use of digraphs has the advantage that there is a large
body of associated theory covering such topics as their
relation to algebraic and differential equations, equivalence
between digraphs and so on. Digraphs have been used by
Lambert33 and others34–37 for the manual construction of
fault trees. Lapp and Powers38 used them in early work on
computer-aided fault tree synthesis and have been followed
by others. A brief overview of digraphs in this context has
been given by Lees6.
Qualitative modelling does have one drawback. In some
situations it is subject to ambiguity, in the sense that it is
indeterminate whether the in uence on a variable of some
other variable(s) is positive or negative. This has been
explored by Waters and Ponton39. The existence of this
problem has not prevented the development of methods
based on the qualitative modelling of fault propagation, but
it is an area requiring further work. Some attempts have
been made to tackle the problem of ambiguity using
additional constraints and heuristics40,41. Qualitative
modelling, and its near synonym na õ¨ ve physics, is now a
topic in its own right and there is a substantial literature42.
COMPUTER-AIDED HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
Some of the methods of hazard identi cation described
appear to lend themselves to computer-aiding using
techniques such as matrices, graph theory and qualitative
modelling. The three methods which have been subject to
the most active development are failure modes and effects
analysis, fault tree synthesis and HAZOP. The  rst two of
these are described in this section and the third in the next
section.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and Fault Tree
Synthesis
A semi-automatic method of failure modes and effects
analysis was described by Taylor43 in 1974 and this has
been followed by a number of other studies44–49 on
computer-aiding of FMEA. At roughly the same time
work began to appear on methods of fault tree synthesis. In
1973 Fussell50 described a method of constructing fault
trees for electrical systems by stringing together mini-fault
trees.
The  rst work on fault tree synthesis for process plants
was the FTS code of Powers and Tompkins51,52, further
developed by Powers and Lapp53–55. These authors
modelled the plant using digraphs. The fault tree is
constructed by selecting the node for the top event of
interest and then developing the causes of this event. The
digraphs for the plant units were created manually.
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Another early code for the synthesis of fault trees was
CAT by Salem, Apostolakis and co-workers56–59. In the
CAT code the models used are cast in decision table form.
The tree is then constructed by nominating a top event and
developing its causes by selecting from the appropriate
entries in the decision tables.
The RIKKE code of Taylor60 utilizes so-called equation
‘bigraphs’, transition tables and mini-fault tree models. The
construction of the tree proceeds by selecting a top event
and developing its causes by tracing through the mini-trees.
The FAULTFINDER code developed from an extension
of the work of Andow on alarm analysis by Martin-Solis,
Andow and Lees61,62, who introduced mini-fault trees in
this application, and then applied this to fault tree synthesis
also. In further work Kelly, Mullhi, Hunt, Lees, Rushton and
co-workers63–75 extended the method to produce the
FAULTFINDER code. The fault tree is constructed by
selecting a top event and building up the tree from mini-
fault trees. These mini-trees are generated automatically
from functional equations of the type described above.
In addition to the codes mentioned, a number of other
methods for fault tree synthesis have been described76–81.
The methods of computer-aiding which are based on fault
propagation have a suf cient degree of commonality that it
is possible to envisage a more generalized tool, able to
support a variety of methods such as HAZOP emulation,
failure modes and effects analysis and fault tree synthesis. A
tool of this kind is the QUEEN code created by Chung82.
Model Generation
As the foregoing account brings out, the creation of the
models of the plant units is a signi cant feature in a
computer-assisted method. The gain from an automatic
method is liable to be largely negated if it is necessary to
create these models by hand. This is true whether the models
are digraphs, decision tables, mini-fault trees or some other
form. There is therefore some interest in automatic
generation of the models themselves83,84.
COMPUTER-ASSISTED HAZOP
Computer-aiding has also been applied to HAZOP and
there are now a number of systems described in the
literature. A detailed review has been made by Rushton85
and a brief overview is given by Lees6.
HAZID (Original Version)
A method for the computer-aiding of hazard identi ca-
tion was described by Parmar and Lees86–88 in 1987. This
code, also entitled HAZID, was the forerunner of the
HAZID system created in the present project. Parmar and
Lees set out to develop a tool for hazard identi cation based
on fault propagation, but did not originally assume that it
would necessarily emulate HAZOP. They considered
variants more akin to fault trees and to failure modes and
effects analysis, but concluded that the HAZOP approach of
examining every potential deviation in every line does offer
the best assurance of completeness and therefore developed
their initial version of HAZID as, in effect, a HAZOP
emulator. The current version of HAZID retains this approach.
Many of the features of the present version of HAZID
were foreshadowed in this earlier version. The plant is
decomposed into units. The fault propagation through the
units is modelled in terms of statements similar in form to
Prolog clauses and the unit models are held in a unit model
library. The creation of the unit models is performed
through a model generation interface, the Prolog statements
being generated automatically from functional, or propaga-
tion, equations. The output report is similar in form to that of
a conventiona l HAZOP. This early version of HAZID was
relatively primitive and lacked features such as a  uid
model and consequence evaluation. Further development of
HAZID has been described by Zerkani and Rushton89,90.
HAZOPEX
HAZOPEX is a prototype expert system for hazard
identi cation which is described by Heino, Karvonen, Suokas
and co-workers91–97. HAZOPEX is a highly interactive tool.
The plant topology is loaded at the start using a model editor.
The user then examines the plant line by line.
The knowledge base in HAZOPEX is organized as a
hierarchy of units, with classes and sub-classes, and with
inheritance of characteristics. Search may be carried out at
two levels. For a general search rules are classi ed by
deviation type and for a lower level search by unit type. The
level of search is controlled by the user.
One characteristic feature of HAZOPEX is that, whereas
other systems use detailed models of the different units, it
uses instead rather generalized tank and line models.
Another feature is that the equipment models are comple-
mented by a relatively well developed  uid model.
Sets of rules are applied for causes, consequences and
countermeasures. The number of rules used is: for causes,
330 rules; for consequences, 20 rules; and for counter-
measures, 20 rules. Thus most of the rules relate to the
causes. Less effort has been put into the consequences and
countermeasures, which are more dependent on the speci c
process.
Various types of display are used to show the output
generated. One gives the results in tabular form, akin to the
output from a conventional HAZOP study. Another shows a
deviation at the centre with two trees attached, the causes
tree being structured rather like a fault tree and the
consequences tree like an event tree.
The project involved a process of continuous evaluation,
which is regarded as having an important role in prototype
development. The authors describe work done to validate
the program using an ammonia storage tank system and
comparing the results obtained with those from a conven-
tional HAZOP study. They also give an account of an
application session.
HAZOPEX has been developed using an expert system
shell running on a LISP machine. The ideas in the
HAZOPEX system were developed further in the STARS
and HAZOPTOOL projects98,99.
Method of Weatherill and Cameron
A prototype system for hazard identi cation has been
described by Weatherill and Cameron100. The code, which
is highly interactive, is used to examine the system line by
line. The user enters, for each line, the identi cation of the
process units to which it is connected and of the  ttings in
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the line. A deviation is treated as a goal, the existence of
which the system attempts to prove by interrogating the
knowledge base for possible causes. The knowledge base
contains facts and rules structured around units rather than
around the deviations. The program is written in Prolog.
COMHAZOP
The COMHAZOP system is described by Rootsaert and
Harrington101. The plant con guration is entered and unit
models are assigned to the units. The program examines
deviations associated with the units and uses rules to
identify the causes of these deviations.
HAZEXPERT
Go¨ring and Schecker102 describe the hazard identi cation
system HAZEXPERT. This aid eschews a HAZOP-style
approach. The plant con guration is entered. A set of pre-
de ned consequences such as overpressure, explosion, etc.,
is used. A search limited in scope around the sets of units
under examination is conducted to discover the causes of
these events. The program contains a generic hazard
knowledge base in which the key concept is the disturbance
of the mass or energy balance. HAZEXPERT is imple-
mented using an expert system shell.
PSAIS
PSAIS (Plant Safety AI System) is described by
Scho¨nenburg103. The program utilizes only a limited
number of rules but holds a large collection of design
cases. Examination of a plant design is based on accessing
‘similar’ cases in the design case database. If no similar case
is found, a new case is created. Use is made of fuzzy
matching. In this way PSAIS bene ts from a continuous
process of learning. A further account is given by Sanders104.
Method of Chae et al.
Chae et al.105 describe an interactive system for the
investigation of the causes and consequences of deviations
of variables chosen by the user. There is a knowledge base
of generic knowledge about process units and  uids. The
plant is decomposed into ‘study nodes’, producing a small
number of ‘vessels’ and ‘transport lines’. The examination
is evidently limited to these study nodes; there does not
appear to be any way to connect the process units together in
the plant.
Method of Shimada et al.
Shimada et al.106,107 give an account of a system for the
investigation of batch plants. The process knowledge base
contains generic knowledge which describes the fault
propagation in the equipment, or units, and speci c
knowledge on the items of equipment in the plant, the
connectivities between them, the  uids present, the reac-
tions occurring and certain attributes of the equipment.
Causal relationships between component failures and
variable deviations are modelled using decision tables, with
a separate decision table for each operational step of the
batch process.
The program is an interactive one, in which the user
speci es the equipment or line and the variable deviation
and obtains the causes and consequences of the deviation.
HAZOPExpert
The HAZOPExpert system has been described by
Venkatasubramanian, Vaidhyanathan and coworkers108–113.
The general approach appears broadly similar to that in
HAZID.
HAZOPExpert utilizes G2 (marketed by Gensym), which
provides an object-oriented shell for development of expert
systems, particularly on-line process systems. G2 is
supported by a strong graphical user interface. This is
utilized in HAZOPExpert to allow the user to specify the
piping and instrument diagram (P&ID).
The process knowledge base consists of both generic and
speci c knowledge. The generic knowledge mainly com-
prises the unit models which describe the fault propagation
in the equipment, or units. The speci c knowledge includes
the items of equipment in the plant, the connectivities
between them, the  uids present and certain attributes of the
equipment. The generation of potential hazards is enhanced
by the use of a  uid model.
The  rst models for HAZOPExpert used a propagation
equation approach, as did Parmar and Lees87,88. In later
accounts the models are based on a ‘HAZOP digraph’
(HDG). This is a form of signed directed graph which
includes nodes which represent faults and consequences.
The  ltering and evaluation of the scenarios generated is
performed using quantitative information such as design
speci cations and  uid properties. This information is used
to make order-of-magnitude estimates of whether or not
identi ed potential hazards are likely to occur.
In HAZOPExpert the normal mode of operation is
interactive. A user initiates the ‘HAZOP’ of a variable by
selecting it on the P&ID and assigning to it a deviation. The
program performs a search and presents the results.
SOME ISSUES IN HAZOP EMULATION
The approach taken in HAZID, and the features provided,
are better understood if there is an appreciation of the issues
and problems which typically arise in developing a tool of
this kind. Some of these issues are brie y discussed below.
Poor Initial Design
If the design submitted to the HAZOP, whether conven-
tional or computer-aided, is poor, the large number of
defects identi ed is liable to overload the process. It is
highly desirable to ensure that a design does not go forward
to HAZOP unless it meets a certain minimum standard. In
the STOPHAZ project this was the motivation for the
development of ELDER, a computer tool for advising on
aspects of an engineering line diagram.
Con guration Defects
A particular class of problem in plant design is that
associated with the con guration of the units. There are
certain con gurations which may be questioned, based on
experience of problems with similar con gurations, without
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resort to fault propagation. An example is the case of a
control valve at the end of a long pipeline containing liquid.
This con guration immediately suggests potential for water
hammer. This type of situation can therefore be dealt with
by a simple con guration rule.
Data Acquisition
A common problem in computer aids for process plant
design is that of data acquisition. The value of the tool is
greatly reduced or even negated if the data input overheads
are excessive. It might be expected, since computer aided
design (CAD) systems have been around for some time, that
there should be little problem in downloading basic plant
data, but in fact this is not the case. CAD systems are still
fragmented and there is not a universal interface into which
a computer aid of the kind described can be ‘plugged’. The
designer of such a system is therefore faced with the need to
provide the interfaces necessary for the acquisition of the
required data.
Plant description
Essential data are those given in the Engineering Line
Diagram (ELD) of the plant, namely the constituent units,
including the controls, and their connectivities. Equally
essential are data on the properties, state and composition of
the  uids in the plant and the design envelope of the plant
de ned in terms of pressure, temperature, etc. It is also
necessary to have what may be termed ‘con gurational’
information. For example, it is necessary to know whether a
set of two pumps shown piped up in parallel is to be run as a
set of two pumps operating in parallel or as a set with one
normally operating and one on standby. Likewise, if there
are two pressure relief valves in parallel it is necessary to
know their duty and capacity.
Operating instructions
It is then necessary to create within the program a plant
representation which is conformable with the method of
analysis to be used. This also is not a trivial problem. For
example, a plant is, or should be, designed to be operated in
a particular way. The operating procedures therefore
constitute a further set of information required for effective
hazard identi cation. In the STOPHAZ project, this was the
motivation for the development of CHOPIN, which is a tool
for capturing operational intent and to allow outline
operating instructions to be produced ef ciently.
Unit models
In the methodology used, the individual units are each
represented by a unit model. Each unit model is a set of
qualitative relations equivalent to a signed directed graph.
The formulation of high quality models requires some
experience and effort. The provision of a unit model library
is a partial solution, but experience shows that in most cases
when constructing a new plant description it is necessary to
con gure one or two new models. It is necessary therefore
to provide some form of tool to assist the user in creating
these models. The user can expect to  nd in the unit
model library the great majority of the models required.
Guidance, however, should be provided to ensure a correct
selection. This points to the need for a sound structure for
the library.
Protections
HAZOP record sheets often have a column which
indicates the protections available for the deviations
examined. These protections are typically alarms, pressure
relief devices, controls and trips. A computer-aided method
is more complete if it can identify where such protections
exist.
Search Ef ciency
Another issue is search ef ciency and program run time.
Despite the power of current PCs, it is still necessary to try
to limit the searches and to make them as economical as
practical.
Output Record
With regard to the format of the output record, the intent
within HAZID is that broadly this should follow that of a
conventiona l HAZOP. It is characteristic of computer-
generated searches that they tend to produce output which
users do not  nd ‘natural’. The issue of casting the output in
a form acceptable to users should be speci cally addressed.
Consequence evaluation
Another characteristic of computer-generated output in
HAZOP emulations is that it tends to include an excessive
number of unimportant consequences. In a conventional
HAZOP these are ‘ ltered out’, often almost unconsciously.
Handling of the large number of ‘false positives’ is perhaps
the single most signi cant problem in developing an
acceptable tool. It is necessary to rank the consequences
and to remove the less signi cant, though the user can be
given some control over the threshold for reporting
consequences. Even if a consequence is retained as
signi cant, there can still be a problem with an excessive
number of causes, most of which are unimportant. This
again requires speci c treatment.
Completeness
Another aspect of quality in the output is completeness in
identifying important consequences. Such completeness is
largely a function of the quality of features such as the unit
models and  uid model.
Correctness
Finally, the output needs to be as free as possible of the
outright errors and nonsenses to which computer-generated
output tends to be prone. The only solution to this problem is
high quality work throughout the system.
OVERVIEW OF HAZID
HAZID is intended as a computer aid for hazard
identi cation. As mentioned previously, it is based on the
code of the same name created by Parmar and Lees although
it is very much more advanced. The intended application of
HAZID is the screening of plant designs prior to their
submission to a conventiona l HAZOP study. It is envisaged
that, if the tool proves worthwhile in this application, it may
gradually become more powerful.
The basic methodology is as follows. The plant is
decomposed into a set of equipments, or units. The plant
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description consists essentially of models of these units and
the connectivities between them and of a model of the  uids
in the plant.
The propagation of faults through the plant is described in
terms of qualitative modelling. This is a technique of
modelling which was used in early work on fault
propagation in process plants by Lees, Andow and co-
workers and which has been developed as a formal
modelling technique with a considerable literature by de
Kleer and other workers42. An important technique of
qualitative modelling is the signed directed graph (SDG).
This too is a formal method supported by an appreciable
literature.
HAZID uses SDGs to qualitatively model individual
equipment items. These SDGs are connected together at run
time to form a large SDG model of the whole plant, which
can be searched to  nd links between possible faults and
consequences.
HAZID Modules
The basic structure of the HAZID software is shown in
Figure 1. The software modules were developed by a
number of member organisations in the STOPHAZ
consortium:
· AutoHAZID was developed mostly by Loughborough
University, with input from VTT to develop their  uid rule
system as a part of the program. AutoHAZID is the central
module in the HAZID system, responsible for HAZOP
emulation and presentation of identi ed hazards in the form
of reports. It was developed in C++, starting from a simpler
and more general program (QUEEN), written in Prolog82.
A more detailed description of AutoHAZID is given in the
next section.
· The Graphical Tool (GT) and the Graphical Con gura-
tion Tool (not shown in Figure 1) were developed by TXT.
The GT allows the user to prepare simpli ed engineering
line diagrams as plant descriptions, for later submission to
AutoHAZID for HAZOP examination. The Graphical
Con guration Tool allows the visual icon used in the GT
to be created and modi ed for any unit model de ned in the
database. It also includes a bitmap editor for the icon used
on the GT button bar.
· Intrasoft were responsible for the design and implemen-
tation of the plant description database and associated
Applications Programming Interface. These parts of the
system allow the plant descriptions produced in the
Graphical Tool to be stored and retrieved later by
AutoHAZID.
· The Unit Model Application Tool (not shown in Figure 1)
was developed by Intrasoft, to allow the user to add new
models to those recognized in the database. It allows
de nition of the ports and the attributes belonging to the
model. It is used, in conjunction with the Graphical
Con guration Tool, to create and modify models to be
used in the plant descriptions produced in the GT.
· The Physical Properties Link (not shown in Figure 1) was
developed by Aspentech and Hyprotech, with advice from
Loughborough University. This interface allows various
calculations of physical properties to be carried out in external
software packages, using a common set of functions.
AutoHAZID Modules
The principal features of the AutoHAZID module are:
1. Decomposition of plant into process units.
2. Use of models of process units based on qualitative
modelling.
3. Generation of scenarios by an inference engine.
4. Use of a  uid model to distinguish between feasible and
infeasible scenarios.
5. Use of rules to detect plant con guration problems.
6. Generation of output as HAZOP-style tables.
7. Model generation tool for new user-de ned unit
models.
Figure 1 also illustrates the structure of AutoHAZID. The
core of AutoHAZID is the HAZOP emulation sub-system.
This is complemented by two other sub-systems: the
con guration checker and the qualitative effects engine.
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Figure 1. The structure of the HAZID Software.
These sub-systems in turn draw on a unit model library and
a  uid model library, and the creation of unit models is
supported by the model generation tool.
The con guration checker consists of a set of heuristic
rules. It analyses the connectivity of the units within the
plant model and warns the user of design  aws. A driver
routine is used to associate the rules with relevant HAZOP
guidewords. The rules developed in this part of AutoHAZID
are described in the following section.
The qualitative effects engine takes as input the plant
model and the unit model library and generates an internal
representation of the plant. It provides a set of procedures
which can be called by other sub-systems to investigate how
the plant will behave, given the deviation of a process
variable, or to investigate the causes of a particular state of a
variable.
The HAZOP emulation sub-system is the driving routine
which mimics the HAZOP procedure by calling on the
qualitative effects engine, con guration checker and  uid
model to perform the necessary inference. It also contains
some  ltering rules to enhance its output.
The unit model library contains unit models in the form of
qualitative relations equivalent to signed directed graphs.
The library is structured hierarchically to assist choice of
models and to permit inheritance between models.
The model generation tool is provided to facilitate the
creation of unit models. It permits the user to create a new
model if the necessary model is not present in the library. It
uses a question and answer session to construct a description
of the structure of the new model, from which a model is
created.
The  uid library contains information on the physical
properties of  uids, such as boiling and freezing points and
 ammability and toxicity.
Con guration Rules
Certain problems in plant design can be identi ed from
the con guration of equipment items on the plant, without
resort to HAZOP. AutoHAZID runs a separate check for a
small number of such con gurational features before
starting HAZOP emulation and the results are blended
into the main HAZOP report by associating each check with
a guide word, such as ‘maintenance’, ‘shutdown’, etc.
The checks currently implemented in AutoHAZID, along
with the associated guidewords used, are:
· Pressure relief (morePressure)—Warns the user about
any vessels on the plant which do not have access to a vent.
· Liquid lock-in (morePressure)—Detects places in the
plant where  uid may be ‘locked in’ by closing valves,
causing possible overpressure in the event of thermal
expansion.
· Maintenance (maintenance)—Warns the user about units
which cannot be isolated and drained for maintenance.
· Shared sensor (notes)—Detects control con gurations
where an alarm and control share the same sensor element,
failure of which could lead to loss of the alarm and control
systems.
· Steam trap bypass (startup)—Warns of potential pro-
blems for start-up if steam traps cannot be bypassed.
· Reverse  ow protection (revFlow)—Warns the user of
the possibility of defeating the reverse  ow protection
offered by check valves. In particular, if one path between
two major units is protected by a check valve and another is
not, then there is a potential problem.
Scope of HAZOP
The user may sometimes wish to analyse part of the plant
or to conduct a partial analysis of the whole plant. One case
might be an examination prior to completing the detailed
design. Another case might be an examination of suscept-
ibility to overpressure. To meet this requirement, Auto-
HAZID allows the user to set the scope of the HAZOP
emulation by restricting the set of units, unit types and/or
guide words to be considered. The user can restrict the scope
of the analysis as follows:
1. Consider only/do not consider a particular set of plant
items.
2. Consider only/do not consider particular types of plant
item.
3. Consider only/do not consider a particular set of guide
words.
Ordering of Units for HAZOP
In a conventional HAZOP the order of examination is not
random. Lines are selected in a reasonably logical and
sequential manner. A long line from a plant inlet through a
parallel pump to a heating section is likely to be examined in
two stages:  rst, the line from the inlet to the pumps and
second, the line from the pumps to the heating section. It is
unlikely that the line sections would be examined in the
reverse order. To be acceptable to the user, AutoHAZID
needs to re ect this logical behaviour. On the other hand,
different users may choose to order HAZOP in different
ways. AutoHAZID should not prevent a user from selecting
a preferred sequence.
AutoHAZID is capable of grouping equipment in the
plant model into lines by  nding paths for potential  uid
 ow between plant inlets and outlets. The user is given the
option of automatic or manual selection of the order in
which the HAZOP is done. If automatic selection is chosen,
AutoHAZID picks out the major units to be HAZOPed from
each line and adds them to an ordered list. If manual
selection is to be used, the user is presented with a list of
units which are to be HAZOPed and is allowed to choose the
order in which the HAZOP is to be conducted.
Input and HAZOP Processing
The normal mode of use for the HAZID package is as
follows:
· The user prepares a plant description, either using the
Graphical Tool, or in a text  le. The plant description gives
details of the equipment items in the plant and their
connections, as well as the  uids present.
· The plant description is read into AutoHAZID and the
program constructs a plant model, in the form of a large
SDG, from the input data.
· AutoHAZID also takes the data given on  uids at this
stage and infers the likely details of  uids elsewhere in the
plant by considering the stream connections between units.
This process is called ‘plant  uid speci cation’, and is
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designed to make the most use of the supplied information,
so that data need only be supplied where they enter the plant
or are changed. The data stored on  uids consist of the
pressure, temperature and  ow rate, as well as a list of the
chemical components present and a list of the mole fractions
of those components. This information is used by the  uid
model system to validate the feasibility of fault path
scenarios produced by graph search.
· When the plant description is read into AutoHAZID, the
program compiles a lookup table for reporting the protec-
tions and preventive devices in the plant. This is used during
the HAZOP emulation stage.
· The user de nes the required scope of the HAZOP
analysis and chooses appropriate  ltering and output control
options, as described in the next section.
· When the user initiates HAZOP emulation, the program
 rst activates the con guration rule system, to detect design
 aws in the plant model. It then starts the HAZOP emulation
process by examining each of the deviations within the
scope of the HAZOP, in an order determined either
automatically by AutoHAZID, or speci ed by the user.
· The causes of each deviation are found by backwards
search in the plant SDG, using a strategy which has been
devised to minimize the amount of repeated search in this
part of HAZOP emulation. The result of the search is a
number of ‘fault paths’ linking initiating faults to deviations
of interest, via a number of process variable deviations.
· The feasibility of the fault paths may be tested by the  uid
model system at this stage, resulting in the rejection of a
number of the fault paths as infeasible.
· When the causes of the deviations have been found, each
deviation is associated with the consequences in the plant
SDG to which it is directly connected. This is a relatively
trivial step and results in a number of complete fault paths,
linking faults to consequences. The completed fault paths
are further veri ed by the  uid model system, so that some
may be rejected at this stage as infeasible.
· Information on any protections and/or preventive devices
is added at this stage, by looking up the deviations seen in
the table constructed when the plant description was loaded.
· Results are reported in a text  le using a HAZOP-style
table with four columns, giving the ‘deviation’, ‘cause’,
‘consequence’ and ‘protections’ for each scenario.
Note that the HAZOP emulation algorithm only searches
locally for consequences of a deviation, but searches for
both local and distant causes of the deviation. This
minimizes the search for consequences, but contrasts with
the technique used in conventional HAZOP practice, where
both local and distant consequences of a deviation are
sought by the team.
Output Format and Filtering
AutoHAZID produces a HAZOP-style report table. It also
has the ability to format the results as a structured text to
serve as an export  le for integration with HAZOP reporting
tools. Also, at the report generation stage some reformatting
and  ltering is carried out to make the report more concise.
The fault propagation engine in AutoHAZID is exhaus-
tive and generally produces a far larger result set than a
conventiona l HAZOP does. Analysis of results from a
conventiona l HAZOP suggests that the HAZOP team prune
results which add no new information in three ways. First, a
conventiona l HAZOP team tends to lump together similar
units in a line. For example, the report may quote ‘leaking
valve in line from storage to reaction section’ as a possible
cause rather than quote each valve in the line. Second, a
cause-consequence pair such as a leaking valve causing a
toxic release may be identi ed under a number of different
deviations, but a conventional HAZOP report will normally
list the scenario only under the deviation where it was  rst
identi ed. Third, a conventiona l HAZOP report tends to
include numerous references to earlier (or indeed later)
deviations in the report as possible causes of the current
deviation. Adding similar  ltering methods to AutoHAZID
makes for a more succinct and recognizable reporting
style.
AutoHAZID therefore incorporates three  lters. The  rst
 lter, which gathers up multiple faults of a particular type in
a line and combines them as a single fault of that type, is
executed after the completion of the HAZOP emulation. For
each deviation, the  lter collects a list of faults found to be
causes of the same consequence. If, within that list, more
than one fault of the same type occurs, only the  rst fault is
listed in the report and it is post xed with the word ‘etc.’ to
show that other similar faults have been  ltered out.
The second  lter, which removes repeated scenarios
generated by different guide words, is also executed after
completion of the HAZOP emulation. The list of results is
scanned for repeated identical cause-consequence pairs, and
only the  rst instance of each pair is retained.
The third and  nal  lter deals with referencing of
deviations as causes. Unit models include faults which
give rise to deviations. For example, a pump model contains
the deviation morePressure. Some deviations have a
‘stopper  ag’ associated with them which is intended to
halt propagation of a path towards a root cause, so that the
deviation can be reported as a cause of some hazard. This is
done primarily to produce more ‘natural’ reports but has the
bene cial side-effect of restricting the length of paths
generated by AutoHAZID. This  lter is employed during
the HAZOP emulation process.
Filtering as just described involves processes of con-
solidation and of stopping. It is to be distinguished from two
other methods of modifying the output record: masking and
consequence evaluation. Masking is the suppression of
display of de ned categories of output. Consequence
evaluation is the ranking of consequences according to
severity, with the purpose of suppressing display of those
below a certain level of severity. Therefore, the user has the
following options for tailoring the results of the analysis:
1. Show only consequences above a certain severity
ranking.
2. Show/do not show consequences of a deviation which has
no identi ed causes.
3. Show/do not show causes of a deviation which has no
identi ed consequences.
4. Remove/do not remove similar causes of a deviation.
5. Remove/do not remove duplicated scenarios identi ed
under different deviations.
6. Show/do not show protections (associated with a reported
scenario, i.e., a cause-consequence pair).
7. Show/do not show scenarios which have (associated)
protections.
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Queries
After an analysis run, the user is provided with a set of
queries which give access to more details on how a
particular result was arrived at. The options are:
1. Show the paths from deviation X to all its causes.
2. Show the paths from consequence X to all its causes.
3. Show any faults which may trigger protection X.
SUMMARY
This paper has given an overview account of the HAZID
software developed during the STOPHAZ project. Firstly,
HAZOP studies and the technique of qualitative modelling
were introduced; then, computer-aided hazard identi cation
was discussed, concentrating on FMEA and fault tree
synthesis. Next, a brief review of computer-assisted
HAZOP research was given. After outlining the typical
issues to be addressed in HAZOP emulation, HAZID was
described, with particular attention given to the AutoHAZID
module, which emulates the HAZOP study method.
The next paper will discuss the unit model system, which
incorporates the knowledge about process units in the
HAZID system. Following that, paper 3 describes the  uid
model system, used to enhance the output from HAZOP
emulation by using knowledge about the behaviour of  uids
in the plant to verify the feasibility of identi ed hazards.
Paper 4 discusses the evaluation and improvement of
HAZID, through the use of case studies and other methods.
Paper 5 then concludes the series with a discussion of
future development issues and an overview of the whole
series.
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